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This document describes the work done during the Research Semester in
Summer 2006 of Prof. Dr. Stefan Wohlfeil. It is about Security Management
tasks and how these tasks might be supported by Open Source software tools.
I begin with a short discussion of general management tasks and describe
some additional, security related management tasks. These security related
tasks should then be added to a software tool which already provides the
general tasks. Nagios is such a tool. It is extended to also perform some
of the security related management tasks, too. I describe the new checking
scripts and how Nagios needs to be configured to use these scripts.
The work has been done in cooperation with colleagues from the Polytech-
nic of Namibia in Windhoek, Namibia. This opportunity was used to also
establish a partnership between the Department of Computer Science at FH
Hannover and the Department of Information Technology at the Polytechnic.
A first Memorandum of Agreement lays the groundwork for future staff or
student exchange.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
It is obvious that computers play an extremely important role in todays life. Not only
private and personal use but also commercial use of computers require high security.
Ecommerce companies rely on the fact that their computers are up and running 24
hours a day and 365 days a year. Security problems like viruses, worms, denial of service
attacks prevent systems from performing their intended functions, thus creating massive
economical losses. Therefore administrators need to make sure, that their systems are
appropriately protected.
In general a secure system needs to provide these properties:
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Confidentiality: This property requires that private information must remain private.
Data containing this kind of information (trade secrets, economic data, strategic
plans, etc.) should only be readable by authorized people (or authorized systems).
People not authorized to read the information should be unable to do so, no matter
if the information is just stored in an IT system or electronically transferred, e.g.
by email.
To ensure this property one can use Access Controls or furthermore Encryption.
Integrity: Information should remain unchanged or at least any change should be de-
tectable by the owner of the information. This property is independent of the
information being just stored somewhere or being in transit from one computer to
another.
An attacker who changes an email which contains important information (e.g. an
offer) should not go unnoticed.
Message Authentication Codes can be used to make sure that the integrity of data
or messages is guaranteed.
Authenticity: This property means, that nobody else than some user itself might claim
to be this user. Normally users of IT systems need an account to use the system.
As anybody can try to use this account, additional measures are needed so that
only the legitimate user can use the account.
Passwords are a technical means to prove identity. If Public Key Cryptography is
available one can also use Digital Signatures to ensure authenticity.
Availability: IT systems should be available to their users whenever users need them.
An ecommerce system like Amazon should be availabe around the clock so that
customers can place their orders at any time.
Building a high-availability cluster is one of the technical measures to achieve this
goal.
1.2 Security Technologies
In order to achieve Confidentiality, Integrity, Authenticity and Availability different
techiques have been developed. Some of these are shortly introduced in this subsection.
Encryption: By encrypting messages users want to make sure that only authorized users
can read the message [Sch96]. Encryption transform a message called plain text using a
function controlled by a parameter called key into a ususally unreadable message called
cipher text. The inverse function is called decryption function. Different encryption
functions exist. They are also called encryption algorithms. Symmetrical encryption
algorithms use only one key for encrypting and decrypting messages. Users need to
agree on this key before they can confidentially exchange messages.
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With asymmetric encrytion two different, yet related keys are used. One key is used
to encrypt a message. This key is called public key because anybody needs to know this
key to encrypt a message for somebody else. The receiver of the message possesses the
second key which is called private key. This key is used to decrypt the message. Only the
receiver knows the private key because nobody else should be able to read the message.
It is important that messages encrypted with the public key cannot be decrypted using
the public key. RSA is a well-known example of such a public key system.
Firewalls: The main purpose of a firewall is separating different networks and con-
trolling all data passing from one network to the other [CZ95, Gon99]. Usually one
of the separated networks is a trusted, internal network while the other network is an
untrusted, external network (usually the Internet). Firewall rules describe which kind
of communication between machines from the different networks is allowed and which
communication should be blocked. Firewalls can operate on different ISO/OSI network
layers. If they operate on the transport layer these firewalls are called packet filtering
router. By using the information in TCP/IP packet headers (like source address, des-
tination address, destination port number, etc.) the packet filter decides if a packet is
allowed to pass. Another kind of firewall, called application level gateway or proxy oper-
ates on the application layer of the protocol stack. They can use additional information
not present in TCP/IP headers like which user is logged in or which command was sent,
etc.
Therefore firewalls should be able to block some attacks originating from the Internet
and directed to the internal network. As firewalls are not perfect and attacks might also
come from internal machines, additional security measures are required.
Intrusion Detection: The purpose of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is to rec-
ognize attacks and inform system administrators about the attack [NN01, Spe03]. The
administrator can then take appropriate action.
Intrusion Detection Systems can work in two different ways:
1. Recognize already know attacks: In this mode, the IDS can alert its user as soon
as it sees a sequence of events which is known as an attack pattern. This mode
produces very few false positives, i.e. alarms which do not belong to an attack.
The drawbacks of this mode are: (1) It can only detect attacks already known.
New and unknown attacks cannot be detected. (2) The user of the IDS needs to
regularly update the attack patterns, so that all know attacks can be recognized.
2. Anomaly Detection: Here the IDS checks if the events that occur belong to normal
use of the system. Everything which is not normal is suspicious and might be an
attack. A big problem here is, finding out what is normal. This mode produces
more false positives because all changes in system use raise an alarm, even if the
change is legitimate.
The events that an IDS uses to recognise attacks might also be twofold:
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1. Network events like IP packets travelling around. This kind of IDS is called Net-
work Based IDS. It looks into all packets travelling in a network and looks for
malicious content. Using this method, attacks can be found even before the pack-
ets have reached their target. However attacks which are performed without using
the network, e.g. attacks by somebody sitting at the console, cannot be detected.
Snort is an open source network based intrusion detection system that uses pat-
terns to detect attacks.
2. Host events like changed files or system calls. This kind of IDS is called Host
based IDS. Integrity checking tools create a snapshot of the important system files
just after the system has been installed. This snapshot is a list of file names and
Message Authentication Codes. The IDS regularly compares the current version of
the important system files with the snapshot. If a file has changed, then an alarm
is raised. The programs tripwire and aide do just that.
Other Host based IDS change the kernel of the operating system and intercept all
system calls. By analysing the system calls, these system can see what happens on
the computer. If some dangerous system calls are made, then an alarm is produced.
2 Management Functions
Most networks have an administrator who is responsible for the network, i.e. that the
network and all important computers in the network are up and running. If problems
occur, then the administrator will work on solving them. Problems might occur for
different reasons:
• Hardware failures, e.g. because of too much heat in the summer.
• Software failures, e.g. because the operating system or a program crashes.
• Denial of Service Attacks, e.g. when a hacker actively attacks a system to produce
software failures or something similar.
The first to reasons have occured since computing has started. With SNMP and RMON
[Sta00] two protocols have been developed to support network management functions.
Administrators are used to these kinds of problems and monitoring tools exist which
address these issues. Denial of Service Attacks have only rarely occured before the
Internet became popular. Today, anybody with Internet access can easily start attacks on
other systems connected to the Internet. And as most of the (important and interesting)
computers are connected to the Internet, they might be targets for this kind of attack.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been built to deal with attacks. However they
are not integrated into the monitoring tools which already exist.
2.1 General Management Functions
System Availability: The first general management operation is about finding out if
a network or a system is still available. To do this one can use the Internet Control
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Message Protocol (ICMP). For example, the ping command sends an ICMP packet to a
machine and waits for the answer. If the command was successful, then one can deduce
that the network is working and the system is also up and running. To be more precise,
one knows that the Operating System (OS) is up and that the networking part, usually
the so called TCP/IP stack, is running.
Service Availability: The next step is to check if the system is also capable of doing
what it should do, i.e. providing the services it should provide. A web server, for example
needs to answer HyperText Tranfser Protocol (HTTP) requests. Besides the system itself
being available this also requires that the process which should provide the service is up
and running. A web server process, e.g. an apache process, might provide the HTTP
service.
To check for service availability one can try to use the service regularly. A check
process running on one machine can try to get an HTML page from a web server. If the
server sends the page, then the service is still running. Otherwise the check should send
a problem report.
2.2 Security Management Functions
Besides the traditional management functions there are some management functions
related to security.
Installed Security Patches: On a secure system all security patches provided by the
manufacturer of the operating system should be installed. Therefore administrators
need to make sure that these updates will be installed. Most update programs provide
mechanisms to automatically download, check and install updates. Very often admin-
istrators like to test updates before installing them, so automatic update functions are
often deactivated. Therefore administrators might forget installing an update.
Integrity Checking: A system which has been hacked successfully is usually manipu-
lated by the hacker. This manipulation should allow later use of the system. Hackers
install so called back doors. These might change important configuration files or ma-
nipulted important system programs, e.g. the login program. One can recognize such
manipulations by inspecting the files of that system.
System integrity also requires that all security updates which are available for this
system are installed. Administrators can either install these updates manually or config-
ure a system to automatically install the updates. In either case it is necessary to check
that all updates were really installed.
Installed Services: If a hacker wants to connect to a computer, usually network con-
nections are used. Therefore the hacker needs to use a network service on the computer.
Some back door programs provide such services by starting a service process which waits
for incomming connections to a particular port number. One can use port scanners to
check for such additional services processes.
5
3 Implementing Management Functions
3.1 Open Source Management Tools
Yast Online Update (YOU): This program is provided by Novell/Suse to perform
online updates of the operating system. The program can also be used to check, if all
security updates and all recommended updates were installed. We will use this feature
in a Nagios script to check the updates on our servers. Jeff Falgout wrote a Perl script
check suse updates.pl. As we use SuSE Linux Enterprise Edition 9 we need to be
registered customers in order to download updates. We use Jeffs script therefore as
follows:
check suse updates.pl -u https://username:password@you.novell.com/update
Other OpenSuSE versions do not need usernames and password. As they might provide
their updates on different servers, the URL in the above command needs to be adjusted.
tripwire/aide: These programs are file system integrity checkers. They compare the
current state of a file system with a previously saved state which is known to be consis-
tent. As soon as some files have changed, e.g. the password file, then this change might
indicate a successful attack.
nmap: The program nmap is a port scanner. It tries to open TCP or UDP connections
to a computer. A securely installed computer should only accept connections to some
services. If an nmap port scan shows additionally activated services on a computer,
e.g. some kind of backdoor service, then this indicates a security problem. Checking
computers on a regular basis using nmap is therefore a security management function.
Checks are performed as follows:
1. The administrator creates a first nmap scan of the target host by issuing the
command checkwithnmap -c ComputerName ScanResult
2. Now the file ScanResult can be used in the following regular scans of the com-
puter ComputerName. Nagios is configured to start the command check-with-nmap
ComputerName ScanResult
As nmap scans might take a while (around one minute or so) the schedule of this check
needs to be adjusted. At most every hour performing this check should be sufficient.
The checkwithnmap script looks like this:
#!/bin/sh
# File: check-with-nmap Skript
# Author: Stefan Wohlfeil
# Date: 2006-11-22
# Purpose: Check a remote computer automatically with nmap
# History: 2006-11-22 Version 1.0
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#
# Return codes and their meaning:
# 0 OK
# 1 Warning but not critical
# 2 Critical or plugin has timed out
# 3 Unknown: some error within the plugin
if [ $# -eq 2 ]
then
rechner=$1;
nmapfile=$2;
if [ ! -r $nmapfile ]
then
echo "File $nmapfile does not exist or is not readable"
exit 2;
fi
# grep filters out the Greeting line of nmap and the last line, too.
# These lines are always different because they contain the date and time
# when nmap was started and how long the scan took.
nmap $rechner | grep -i -v Nmap | diff $nmapfile - > /dev/null
result=$?;
if [ "$result" == "0" ]
then
echo "Open Ports OK - Nothing has changed"
exit $result
else
echo "Open Ports ERROR - Something has changed. Check with comand $0"
exit 2
fi
elif [ $# -eq 3 ]
then
if [ "$1" == "-c" ]
then
rechner=$2;
nmapfile=$3;
if [ ! -w $nmapfile ]
then
echo "File $nmapfile cannot be written to."
exit 2;
fi
nmap $rechner | grep -i -v Nmap > $nmapfile
else
echo "Usage: ‘basename $0‘ [-c] MACHINE-NAME EXPECTED-OUTPUT-FILE";
exit 3;
fi
else
echo "Usage: ‘basename $0‘ [-c] MACHINE-NAME EXPECTED-OUTPUT-FILE";
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exit 3;
fi
Nagios: On its web site the developers of Nagios describe their tool as follows:
Nagios is a host and service monitor designed to inform you of network prob-
lems before your clients, end-users or managers do. It has been designed to
run under the Linux operating system, but works fine under most *NIX vari-
ants as well. The monitoring daemon runs intermittent checks on hosts and
services you specify using external ”plugins” which return status information
to Nagios. When problems are encountered, the daemon can send notifica-
tions out to administrative contacts in a variety of different ways (email,
instant message, SMS, etc.). Current status information, historical logs, and
reports can all be accessed via a web browser.
So Nagios is the management tool that I will use as the basis for the security management.
By configuring it appropriately and extending it, some of the security management
functions were implemented. Figure 1 shows a screen shot of the Nagios installation at
the Department of Computer Science at FH Hannover.
Figure 1: Nagios Screen Shot
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3.2 Installing, Configuring and Extending Nagios
In this subsection all steps to set-up Nagios are explained. It begins with how to down-
load and install Nagios, continues with how it can be configured and finishes with an
explanation of the extensions which were made for the security management tasks.
Installing Nagios: In order to get an appropriately configured Nagios [Bar05] imple-
mentation, some special care needs to be taken. In this section the installation process
is described in detail. We begin with the general installation procedure and after that
we describe the configuration.
1. Download the current version of Nagios from http://www.nagios.org/
2. Unpack the software:
cd Software
ta r xzvf . . / Download/nagios −2.4 . ta r . gz
3. Create a Nagios user and a Nagios group. Add the user to the group.
useradd nag ios ;
groupadd nag ios ;
usermod −G nag ios nag ios ;
4. Create a group for Nagios commands.
groupadd nagcmd ;
5. Add the user id of the web server process (wwwrun) to the group Nagios commands.
This is necessary, so that users can start commands using the web interface. In
that case, the web server process starts the commands on behalf of the user.
usermod −G nagcmd wwwrun ;
usermod −G nagcmd nag ios ;
6. Configure Nagios, so that it is installed in /opt/ and so that the users and groups
created above are used. Compile the program and install it.
. / c on f i gu r e −−p r e f i x=/opt/ nag ios −−with−c g i u r l=/nag ios / cg i−bin \\
−−with−htmurl=/nag ios −−with−nagios−user=nag ios \\
−−with−nagios−group=nag ios −−with−command−group=nagcmd
make a l l
make i n s t a l l
7. Tell the web server that the Nagios web interface is available. Create a file
nagios.conf in/etc/apache2/.
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Sc r i p tA l i a s / nag ios / cg i−bin /opt/ nag ios / sb in
<Direc tory ”/ opt/ nag ios / sb in”>
Options ExecCGI
AllowOverride None
Order al low , deny
Allow from a l l
AuthName ”Nagios Access ”
AuthType Bas ic
AuthUserFile /opt/ nag ios / e t c /htpasswd . u s e r s
Require va l id−user
</Directory>
Al ia s / nag ios /opt/ nag ios / share
<Direc tory ”/ opt/ nag ios / share”>
Options None
AllowOverride None
Order al low , deny
Allow from a l l
AuthName ”Nagios Access ”
AuthType Bas ic
AuthUserFile /opt/ nag ios / e t c /htpasswd . u s e r s
Require va l id−user
</Directory>
Now tell apache that this file is available by adding
Include /etc/apache2/nagios.conf
to the file httpd.conf.
As the web server is also responsible to authenticate users, these users need to be
added.
htpasswd2 −c /opt/ nag ios / e t c /htpasswd . u s e r s nagiosadmin
htpasswd2 /opt/ nag ios / e t c /htpasswd . u s e r s w oh l f e i l
8. As the software package only contains the basic Nagios software, some additional
Nagios plug-ins need to be installed. This is done as follwos:
ta r xzvf . . / Download/nagios−plug ins −1 . 4 . 3 . ta r . gz ;
cd nagios−plug ins −1 . 4 . 3 ;
. / c on f i gu r e −−p r e f i x=/opt/ nag ios
make a l l
make check
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When doing the check, the appropriate computer names or IP addresses need to
be provided.
9. Create a new configuration file fbi.cfg in Nagios etc directory. Change the
standard configuration nagios.cfg such that fbi.cfg is read by nagios.cfg. The
file fbi.cfg contains all the special information about the Fachbereich Informatik
(FBI). Within nagios.cfg also change the date format to ISO standard using a
line like date format=iso8601
Configuring Nagios: The Nagios server of the Department of Computer Science at
FH Hannover monitors the departments server machines. The Nagios server itself is
located in the Intranet of the Department. This Intranet is separated from the Uni-
versity network by a firewall. The firewall uses the classical Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
architecture. Therefore some of the monitored machines are located behind packet filters
(routers). See figure 2 for details.
Figure 2: The Nagios Map of the monitored machines
Nagios should be used to check if all security updates are installed on the Nagios server
itself. In order to do so, these steps are required:
1. Write a check function check suseupdates ds10 in file checkcommands.cfg as
follows:
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define command {
command_name check_suseupdates_ds10
command_line $USER1$/check_suse_updates.pl -u https://xxx:yyy@you.novell.com/update/
}
2. Define a service check in the file fbi.cfg as follows:
define service {
use generic-service ; Name of service template to use
host_name dellserver10
service_description SuSE Updates installed
is_volatile 0
check_period 24x7
max_check_attempts 4
normal_check_interval 1440
retry_check_interval 60
contact_groups swohlfeil
notification_options w,u,c,r
notification_interval 1440
notification_period 24x7
check_command check_suseupdates_ds10
}
Now Nagios automatically checks, if all security updates are installed. Doing the same
check on a machine different from the Nagios server itself requires more work. Before
checking one needs to open a SSH connection to the machine which should be checked.
Our VPN gateway is an example of such a machine. To perform the check one has to
do:
1. Write a checking function is file checkcommands.cfg as follows:
define command{
command_name check_suseupdates_vpn
command_line $USER1$/check_by_ssh -H $HOSTADDRESS$ -i /opt/nagios/etc/.ssh/id_dsa
-t 60 -C "/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_suse_updates.pl
-u http://dellserver10.inform.fh-hannover.de/suseupdate"
}
This check function uses the check by ssh function. This function connects the
Nagios server to a remote machine and then performs the command line given as
parameter -C on the remote machine. In order to open the connection without
entering a password we use public key authentication.
2. Define a service for this check in file fbi.cfg as follows:
define service{
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use generic-service ; Name of service template to use
host_name vpn
service_description SuSE Updates installed
is_volatile 0
check_period 24x7
max_check_attempts 4
normal_check_interval 1440
retry_check_interval 60
contact_groups admins
notification_options w,u,c,r
notification_interval 1440
notification_period 24x7
check_command check_suseupdates_vpn
}
Extending Nagios: With nmap we can quickly check, if additional services have been
installed on a server. To do this, we save the output of nmap when the server has been
checked. This output contains information about which ports are open. A Nagios script
then calls nmap regularly and compares the output of each run with the saved output.
However the nmap output contains a first line with the date and time when nmap was
started. This line always differs between two runs of nmap. The same is true for the last
line. nmap writes the time it took to perfom the scan in the last line. Before comparing
the files, these two lines need to be filtered out. This is automatically done by the script
presented in section 3.1.
The script is installed in the Nagios directory where all other scripts are installed, too.
Then the administrator needs to create a default output file of the nmap check of one
machine by issuing these commands:
touch computer-name-output.txt
checkwithnmap -c computer-name computer-name-output.txt
As the script requires that the output file already exists, the touch command creates
an empty output file. Then the check script creates the filtered output. The adminis-
trator should check the output to find open ports which should not be open. Then the
administrator can add the regular check to Nagios. First a Nagios command is created:
# Command to check open ports on a machine
# ARG1 = Name of file with the "normal" nmap output
define command{
command_name check_with_nmap
command_line $USER1$/checkwithnmap $HOSTADDRESS$ $USER1$/$ARG1$
}
The check script and the normal output file should be located in the same directory. The
variable USER1 hold the directory name. The second argument of the Nagios command
then specifies the file name. The regular service check is then configured:
define service{
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use generic-service ; Name of service template to use
host_name paul
service_description Open Ports
is_volatile 0
check_period 24x7
max_check_attempts 4
normal_check_interval 60
retry_check_interval 10
contact_groups admins
notification_options w,u,c,r
notification_interval 960
notification_period 24x7
check_command check_with_nmap!paul-normal.txt
}
In our case the computer named paul is checked an the file with the expected nmap
output is called paul-normal.txt.
4 Conclusion
4.1 General results
This work has shown that adding security extensions to Nagios and configuring Nagios
appropriately allows performing some security management functions. By adding the
nmap script, a Nagios server can (1) automatically check, if no additional services have
been added to a server and (2) that all services which are expected to be available on
the server really are available. Hackers installing a backdoor wil be recognized fast and
appropriate action can follow.
Nagios can also automatically check, if all security patches of a SuSE Linux system
are installed. If this script fails or notices that updates are missing, an alert is sent to
the administrator. This is useful if administrators don’t want to automatically install
security updates. Reasons might be, that automatical updates might require a reboot
and the administrator doesn’t want unattended reboots. On mission critical machines
administrators often also prefer checking security updates before installing them. Now
Nagios offers an alert mechanism which tells administrators when they need to work on
security updates on their machines.
4.2 Frist practical experiences
We use Nagios with the described extensions at the Department of Computer Science of
Fachhochschule Hannover. Especially the script which checks for available updates has
proven to be very useful. As security updates were published in irregular time intervals
it is convenient to have such an automatic check. Although all operating system vendors
provide mailing lists where security updates were announced, the script is still very
useful. The reason is that all updates are announced on these lists, even if the update
is for a package not installed in our configuration. The script only checks for updates of
packages installed.
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A second advantage of the script is, that the announcement often is sent a few days
after the patch has been distributed to the download sites. So the scripts might notify
about these updates earlier than the distributor does on its mailing lists.
Experiences with the nmap script are also positive. It is used to closely monitor our
SSH server. This server can be contacted from the Internet and is therefore open for
attacks. The regular port scans would quickly show if a hacker had successfully hacked
the machine and installed some backdoor processes.
The only drawback of this script is, that it generates false alarms in our Intrusion
Detection System. Our IDS can recognize port scans as an attack preparation. However
the nmap port scan is a discovery action so it should not generate an alert with the IDS.
So we need to either ignore these alarms or reconfigure our IDS.
4.3 Future work
The current extensions of Nagios are only a first step towards automatic security man-
agement. We plan to add more management functions to Nagios. There are at least two
more useful management function
1. Check the integrity of a remote computers hard disk. This requires creating a
Nagios plug-in which can use tripwire oder aide to recognize potentially dangerous
changes to the file system.
2. Check the log files of a remote computer for suspicious entries. This requires a
plug-in which uses software like logsurfer.
Moreover we also plan to manage Microsoft Windows Computers by integrating the
Microsoft Baseline Security Analysis (MBSA) tool into Nagios.
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5 Cooperation with Polytechnic of Namibia
The Department of Computer Science has agreed to sign a memorandum of under-
standing with the Polytechnic of Namibia. It is the first step towards a closer working
relationship. Its goals are exchanging staff or students between the institutions.
5.1 The Memorandum of Understanding
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
POLYTECHNIC OF NAMIBIA
13 Storch Street
Private Bag 13388
Windhoek
NAMIBIA
Telephone: (+264-61) 207- 2000/1/2/3
Facsimile: (+264-61) 207-2100
AND
Fachhochschule Hannover
Department of Computer Science
Ricklinger Stadtweg 120
30459 Hannover
GERMANY
Telephone: (+49-511) 9296-1800/1/2
Telefax: (+49-511) 9296-1810
This MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT outlines a program of cooperation between
the Department of Information Technology at the Polytechnic of Namibia hereinafter
referred to as the POLYTECHNIC and the Department of Computer Science at the
Fachhochschule Hannover hereinafter referred to as the FHH/CS.
WHEREAS the POLYTECHNIC and the FHH/CS recognize the value of educational
cooperation and exchanges for the purpose of deepening the understanding of scientific,
technological, historical, social, economic and political issues, as well as the traditions of
each of the respective cultures; and WHEREAS the POLYTECHNIC and the FHH/CS
affirm the desirability of strengthening the bonds between the two academic communities
through the development of curricula, exchange and secondment of faculty, staff and
students and research at both institutions.
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
In order to promote international co-operation and understanding and to foster insti-
tutional development, the two institutions agree to co-operate in the areas of: curriculum
development, faculty, staff and students exchange; research and materials exchange.
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1. CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT
POLYTECHNIC and the FHH/CS agree to develop and upgrade curricula and
qualifications with the objective of offering quality programmes and qualifications
subject to the approval by the respective Senates.
2. FACULTY/STAFF EXCHANGE
In order to promote professional development at their respective institutions, the
institutions agree to establish an exchange program for faculty and professional
staff. The host institution agrees to provide hospitality in the form of office space,
library privileges, access to technology and resources and other local privileges
customarily afforded to faculty in residence.
The host institution will also assist in the finding of suitable accommodation and
assist with compliance with immigration regulations of the host country. Faculty
exchanges will be mutually agreed upon between the institutions and will be based
on a work plan covering the full period of the exchange. The visiting scholar will
prepare a final report upon completion of the exchange period.
3. STUDENT EXCHANGE
The two institutions will develop and conduct a student exchange program offer-
ing coursework, internships, joint projects, and research which are directed at the
preparation of highly qualified and internationally competent graduates in Com-
puter Science and Information Technology.
Participants will be registered students, selected by their respective institutions to
participate in the program on the terms agreed between the institutions.
In general, English will serve as the language of instruction at both institutions
during exchange periods. However, language programmes will be developed in
German to help students cope with language demands while on exchange.
4. RESEARCH AND MATERIALS EXCHANGE
The POLYTECHNIC and FHH/CS will encourage and promote collaborative re-
search activities between the faculties, staff and students of the two institutions
to promote the generation of knowledge and development of the institutions and
their respective societies. This will include upgrading of laboratory facilities and
the installation of specialized equipment for relevant departmental laboratories.
5. FORMAL FACULTY AND STUDENT DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES
To further build human capacity in Department of Information Technology at
the Polytechnic of Namibia the FHH/CS will offer nominated staff and students
opportunities to obtain formal qualifications in the full-time mode at Bachelors
and Masters degree levels. The specific terms and conditions will be agreed upon
in an addendum that will form part of this agreement.
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6. FUNDING
The POLYTECHNIC and FHH/CS agree to investigate opportunities to raise
funds to support the different activities in the partnership. POLYTECHNIC and
FHH/CS agree to facilitate activities with Namibian business and industry when
appropriate, and vice versa.
7. PROGRAM COORDINATORS
As specific and mutual areas of interest are identified and agreed, each institution
will appoint a program coordinator to assure the implementation of the various
planned activities.
8. IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS
Supplemental agreements will be entered into to establish details for the operation
and implementation of specific programs and will become attachments to this
Memorandum of Agreement.
9. DURATION OF AGREEMENT
This Memorandum of Agreement will be effective upon signature by duly autho-
rised representatives and will be effective for a period of five years.
10. AMENDMENT OF AGREEMENT
This Memorandum of Agreement may be amended by mutual consent, in writing,
as appropriate from time to time.
11. TERMINATION
This Memorandum of Agreement may be terminated by either party following a
90-day written notice. However, the effective date of cancellation shall not take
place prior to the completion of an on-going activity.
Signed at Windhoek, NAMIBIA, on this.................... day of ............................ 2006.
FOR: FOR:
FH Hannover, Department of Polytechnic of Namibia
Computer Science
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dean Rector
WITNESS: WITNESS:
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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